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Introduction
I came across the little known WW1 battle known as the Action of St Eloi when I was researching my Grandfather’s service with 2 KSLI in WW1 and found that there was no comprehensive source of information on the internet. I therefore decided to publish the results of my research in this website to assist any other researchers who might be interested.
Location
St Eloi is a small hamlet located to the South of Ypres in Belgium at the South Eastern corner of the area known as the Ypres Salient which was a section of the front line formed when the Germans were pushed out of Ypres in late 1914 and fell back to elevated positions around Ypres forming a salient
Prelude to the Battle
On 10-13 March 1915 the British army carried out its first major offensive of the war against the German lines at Neuve Chappelle in France south of St Eloi. Although the attack went well initially the British were unable to consolidate their positions due to a number of reasons including communication difficulties and lack of artillery ammunition. It is believed the Germans carried out their attack on St Eloi on 14th March in response to the Neuve Chappelle attack although the preparations at St Eloi had been in progress for some time before the battle
The Situation prior to the Battle
The British 27th Infantry Division took over the St Eloi sector from French forces in January 1915 and were horrified at the state of the front lines. The German trenches were located on higher ground and were so close to British trenches in some places that when the Germans were pumping water out of their trenches it was running straight into the British trenches. The 27th Division Commander had asked permission from his top brass to relocate the British trenches further back to drier ground where they could be maintained more easily and superior defences established. However the Army Commanding Generals refused to give up an inch of ground. In some places the ground was so waterlogged that it was impossible to dig trenches and breastworks were constructed instead which were comprised of sandbags stacked up to provide rudimentary shelter for the troops.
General Snow notes on Conditions in St Eloi
Result of Aerial reconnaissance of the German Defences on 26 February 1915
The Mound
The hamlet of St Eloi was dominated by a man made feature known as “ The Mound”. The Mound was a 20-30 foot high clay spoil heap that had been formed by disposal of waste clay from the adjacent brick works. The side that occupied the Mound enjoyed a significant tactical advantage over the other side due to it providing a clear view across the area and its suitability for locating a machine gun detachment and other defences.
The Combatants
The German Army
The German 3rd Bavarian Infantry Division occupied the lines at St Eloi in March 1915. The 3rd Division comprised of the 5th Brigade which included the 22nd and 23rd Bavarian Infantry Regiments and the 6th Brigade which consisted of the 17th and 18th Bavarian Infantry Regiments together with the 1st and 3rd Companies Pioneers together with the 19th Prussian Siege Company
The British Army
The 27th Infantry Division occupied the St Eloi sector at the time of the battle. This division consisted mainly of regular army units that had been withdrawn from duty around the British Empire supplemented by territorial units. The division comprised of 3 Brigades the 80th, 81st and 82nd Brigades
Divisional Troops
1st Brigade Royal Field Artillery
19th Brigade Royal Field Artillery
20th Brigade RFA was attached to the division from 27th Division 14th March
61st Howitzer Battery Royal Field Artillery
1/1 and 1/2 Wessex Field Company Royal Engineers
19th Brigade Royal Field Artillery
20th Brigade RFA was attached to the division from 27th Division 14th March
61st Howitzer Battery Royal Field Artillery
1/1 and 1/2 Wessex Field Company Royal Engineers
The Battle
The Battle from the German perspective
It is usually difficult to find details of smaller WW1 battles from the viewpoint of the Germans but in this case I was able to find details of interviews of German soldiers captured on 15 March 1915 in the 27th Division Intelligence report. The captured soldiers revealed some interesting details of the preparations for the attack as follows:
With great difficulty the 19th Prussian Siege Company were able to tunnel under “ the Mound” and its adjacent trenches and set a large explosive charge known as a mine. At 12 noon on 14th March 1915 the German troops were told to prepare for an assault on the British lines in St Eloi. Infantry occupied the German front line trench and support trench behind. Pioneers carrying construction equipment and materials occupied the saps leading forward from the front lines towards the British lines as shown below. At 5pm the mine was exploded and the Pioneers and front line infantry rushed the Mound and the British front line trenches which were duly captured and the defensive positions reversed. Immediately following the explosion the British artillery opened fire on the German support trench and the infantry waiting there were basically wiped out and were unable to take part in the attack
With great difficulty the 19th Prussian Siege Company were able to tunnel under “ the Mound” and its adjacent trenches and set a large explosive charge known as a mine. At 12 noon on 14th March 1915 the German troops were told to prepare for an assault on the British lines in St Eloi. Infantry occupied the German front line trench and support trench behind. Pioneers carrying construction equipment and materials occupied the saps leading forward from the front lines towards the British lines as shown below. At 5pm the mine was exploded and the Pioneers and front line infantry rushed the Mound and the British front line trenches which were duly captured and the defensive positions reversed. Immediately following the explosion the British artillery opened fire on the German support trench and the infantry waiting there were basically wiped out and were unable to take part in the attack
The Battle from the British perspective.
The following accounts reflect the British viewpoint of the battle as recorded in the unit and Brigade war diaries
2nd Battalion Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry ( 2DCLI)
At 5pm on 14th March 1915 2DCLI were occupying the front line trenches in St Eloi with a machine gun team on the Mound, 2 companies in trenches 17 and 18 in front of the mound and one company further back in trench S9. At 5pm a mine was exploded under the Mound causing it to collapse burying the machine gun team. Immediately afterwards mines were blown under trenches 17 and 18. German troops took control of the Mound and trenches 17 and 18 with overwhelming force and 2DCLI fell back into St Eloi. The battalion suffered heavy casualties in the attack with 6 officers killed, 2 missing presumed dead and 4 wounded. Of the Other Ranks 42 were killed, 59 wounded and 35 missing. At midnight on 14th the remnants of the Battalion were relieved by 1st Battalion Royal Irish Regiment.
Summary of Battle by Commander of 82nd Infantry Brigade
Throughout the day of 14th March German artillery was opening fire on different positions in the British lines for short periods. This was determined later to be registering the aim of the guns in preparation for the attack. In the late afternoon small arms fire which had been fairly constant throughout the day stopped and all was quiet. Then at 5pm there were huge explosions under the Mound and trenches 17 and 18 followed by a heavy artillery barrage on St Eloi which quickly cut all of the phone wires leading to the headquarters located in the rear. Immediately following the explosions massed formations of German troops emerged from their trenches led by troops armed only with hand bombs ( no rifles). These troops dealt with the surviving British troops in the Mound and nearby trenches. The troops following behind brought forward construction tools and materials. By 6pm trenches 14-20 and the Mound had all been taken and the British were in chaos due to the total lack of communication with the rear. The only information received by the British commanders came from officers running forward to recon the front lines
Summary of the Battle by Major General Fortesque, Commander of 80th Infantry Brigade
Received an order at Westoutre on the afternoon of March 14th to march the 80th Brigade from Zevecoten to Dickebush as the enemy had broken into our trenches at St Eloi, I gave orders to the Brigade to march at once to Dickebush and proceeded forward myself by Motor to receive my orders from G.o.C., 27th Division and ascertain the situation, which turned out to be that Brigadier General Longley, Commanding 82nd Brigade, was going to make a counter attack later on in the night with the object of recovering the lost trenches and the Mound at St Eloi and that the 4th Battalion Kings Royal Rifles which happened to the the leading Battalion of the 80th Brigade was to proced to Voormezele at once and be under the orders of the Brigadier General Commanding, 82nd Brigade, and that the rest of the 80th Brigade were to act in
support in case its services should be required to confirm the success of the operation. I accordingly made arrangements for the Battalions composing the Brigade to draw bombs, sandbags, shovels, etc., and any other articles that might be necessary for the purpose, to proceed to Kruistraathoek and there be disposed as follows - 4th Bn. Rifle Brigade In-line along the road from Kruisstraathoek towards Elzonwalie with its left resting on the cross roads, the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry in line along the road from Kruisstraathoek to Ypres with its right resting on the former, the 3rd Battalion King's Royal Rifles in the grounds of Kruisstraathoek Chateau and the 2nd Battalion Kings Shropshire Light Infantry on the road immediately West of this Chateau, and I established my leadquarters in the Château. where I received orders by telephone to proceed forward to Voormezele,
to which village my Brigade was to be moved, and to keep myself in touch with Brigadier General Longley which I accordingly did, the last Battalion arriving there about 1 a.m. March 15th•
The counter attack of the 82nd Brigade was launched at 2 a.m and it was not long after that hour that stragglers began to arrive at Voormezele saying that the counter attack had been a failure and had been beaten back. Accordingly about 5 a.m. Brigadier General Longley requested me to launch my Brigade against the Mound I gave orders that the 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade should attack the mound by way of the Voormezele- St Eloi road, the road to the West of it close to the mound being Impassable through a bog and that the Princess Patricia's Light Infantry should co-operate on their left to the end of the Voormezele• Oostaverne road and attack from the direction of 19 trench, clearing any of the enemy out of this and trenches 20 and 21. The 2nd Battalion King's Shropshire Light Infantry, less one company that I kept in reserve at Voormezele , were ordered to move in support of the Rifle Brigade and the 3rd Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps in support of the P.P.C.L.I. I left it to Lt. Colonel. F. Farquhar, the Battalion Commander, to decide when he arrived nearer the scene of action as to the exact point and direction from which he should launch his attack. He decided to do so from Shelly Farm, but his progress across country was necessarily very slow and there was not much time left before day break. He ascertained from Major Prowse in St Eloi that trench 20 had been re-taken. He therefore changed his objective from Shelly’s Farm to the breastwork 200 yards West of it.From this point he
organised an attack by one company against trench 19 via the back of trench 20. This was made in three parties, the first two being composed of one platoon and the third of two platoons. The heavy Machine Gun fire from the Mound prevented the attack from being a success and as it was now broad daylight and he had already lost 1 Officer and 7 N.C.Os and men killed, 2 Officers and 17 N.C.Os and men wounded Lt.Colonel Farquar deemed it best to withdraw as he was unable to surprise the position. Meanwhile the 4th Bn. Rifle Brigade had proceeded along the road from St Eloi. Therefore he halted in order to allow the P.P.C.L.I. to come up abreast of him on his left, but as this Battalion was delayed by the number of men moving in the opposite direction he decided to wait no longer for fear of being overtaken by daylight before he could launch his attack. In the meanwhile I had ascertained through Brigadier General Longley that the R.B. trench previously reported as unoccupied by the Germans was now occupied by them, and this information was telephoned on to Colonel Thesiger. He therefore had to arrange to re-take the R.B. trench as well as the Mound. He therefore, after leaving behind a company in reserve moved along the road until he reached a point about 180 yards from the R.B. trench and 200 yards from the Mound. From this point, marked by a fallen tree, he directed one company under Captain Price to attack the RB. trench, after warning the occupants of s.9 trench that he was about to do so.
This was gallantly accomplished by Captain Mostyn Price's company, and about 15 minutes after this company had started on this errand, (in order to give it time to deploy ), Colonel Thesiger launched Captain M.B.Selby Smyth's company down the road against the Mound. The leading platoon was heavily fired on from a barricade and it was reported that all but four of them were either killed or wounded, including Captain Selby Smyth and 2nd Lieutenant C.Saunders. The remainder of the company was then ordered to rush the barricade which was done only to find that there was yet another barricade to be rushed, this was done in both instances by the next company under Lieutenant L.Stopford-Sackville who also cleared the houses on each side. At this point heavy Machine Gun fire was opened from the mound from another direction and rifle fire from a third barricade, but though repeated efforts were made by Individual officers and men to rush the Mound, their efforts were unavailing, as the congestion of men killed and wounded on the road made the bringing up of reinforcements very difficult.
Colonel Thesiger however sent back for his reserve company of the Rifle Brigade and for two companies of the 2nd Battalion K.S.L.I. under Major Bailey. The former being unable to get up through being blocked, the latter were ordered to charge, but the congestion on the road made any combined rush out of the question, though Captain C.Vasser Smith reached the foot of the Mound when he fell wounded the effort was unavailing, so as it was now broad daylight Colonel Thesiger decided to retire as owing to the quantity of debris in the houses and the state of the ground a house to house advance through them was impossible.
Colonel Thesiger attributes failure to -
The absence of accurate information about the existence of the barricades owing to lack of time.
- The impossibility of reconnaissance as daybreak was so near.
- The fact that 50% of his Battalion is composed of untrained men to whom this proved too high an ordeal, as only the very best of troops such as we had at the beginning of the war could
have done it
names from his Battalion, no one of the P.P.C.L.I. is included.
The Battle as recorded in the War Diary of 1st Battalion Leinster Regiment
The counter attack by the Leinster Regiment as documented in the regimental history
The Battle as recorded in the War Diary of the Second Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers
Account of the Battle according to the history of the Second Battalion King’ Shropshire Light Infantry
At 7 pm the battalion was called out and marched up to Dickebusch. A counter-attack by two battalions of the 82nd Brigade had made some progress, but was held up by machine-gun fire from the mound and trenches on each side of it. About 4.30am on the morning of the 15th the 80th Brigade was called on to attack the mound and neighbouring trenches. It moved forward with the 4th Rifle Brigade leading on the right, and Princess Patricia's Light Infantry on the left. The battalion and the 3rd K.R.R.C. followed in support. The Canadians could accomplish little against the machine-gun fire from the mound, but on the right the Rifle Brigade regained several trenches, though all their efforts against the mound were unavailing. W and Y Companies of the battalion were then brought up. Day was already breaking, however, and their advance was stopped in its turn by the enemy's machine-guns.
Captain C.M. Vassar-Smith was severely wounded at the head of his company when close to the enemy's position; it was impossible to get him in until the following night, and his leg had subsequently to be amputated. Other casualties were 4 killed and 24 wounded. Later in the morning Colonel Bridgford was ordered to retake the mound with the battalion during the following night. These orders were, however, countermanded in the afternoon.
Captain C.M. Vassar-Smith was severely wounded at the head of his company when close to the enemy's position; it was impossible to get him in until the following night, and his leg had subsequently to be amputated. Other casualties were 4 killed and 24 wounded. Later in the morning Colonel Bridgford was ordered to retake the mound with the battalion during the following night. These orders were, however, countermanded in the afternoon.
The Battle as documented in the War Diary of 20th Brigade Royal Field Artillery (RFA)
Battle as recorded in the War Diary of 1st Brigade Royal Field Artillery
Account of the counter attack as recorded by the Commanding Officer of PPCLI
Account of the Battle from the perspective of the 1/1 Battalion Cambridgeshire Regiment
The Cambridgeshire regiment were somewhat different to the other units in 27th Division as they were a Territorial Army regiment not part of the professional army like the other units. A very interesting account of their involvement in the battle can be found at the following website.
www.cambridgeshireregiment1914-18.co.uk/st-eloi.html
The account includes quotes from personal letters to family
www.cambridgeshireregiment1914-18.co.uk/st-eloi.html
The account includes quotes from personal letters to family
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s Account of the Battle
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle of Sherlock Holmes fame attempted to join the Army when the war broke out but aged 55 he was deemed to be too old. He therefore decided to contribute in other ways One of which was to document the war in a series of non fiction books. The following description of the Action of St Eloi is taken from his book
On March 14th, two days after the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, the Germans endeavoured to bring about a counter-stroke in the north which should avenge their defeat, arguing, no doubt, that the considerable strength which Haig's First Army had exhibited in the south meant some subtraction from Smith-Dorrien at the other end of the line. This new action broke out at the hamlet of St. Eloi, some miles to the south-east of Ypres, a spot where many preliminary bickerings and a good deal of trench activity had heralded this more serious effort. This particular section of the line was held by the Eighty-second Brigade (Longley's) of the Twenty-seventh Division (Snow), the whole quarter being under the supervision of General Plumer. There was a small mound in a brickfield to the south-east of the village with trenches upon either side of it which were held by the men of the 2nd Cornish Light Infantry. It is a mere clay dump about seventy feet long and twenty feet high. After a brief but furious bombardment, a mine which had been run under this mound was exploded at five in the evening, and both mound and trenches were carried by a rush of German stormers. These trenches in turn enfiladed other ones, and a considerable stretch was lost, including two support trenches west of the mound and close to it, two breastworks and trenches to the north-east of it, and the southern end of St. Eloi village.
So intense had been the preliminary fire that every wire connecting with the rear had been severed, and it was only the actual explosion upon the mound—an explosion which buried many of the defenders, including two machine-guns with their detachments — which made the situation clear to the artillery in support. The Nineteenth and Twentieth Brigades concentrated their thirty-six eighteen-pounders upon the mound and its vicinity. The German infantry were already in possession, having overwhelmed the few survivors of the 2nd Cornwalls and driven back the 2nd Irish Fusiliers, who were either behind the mound or in the adjacent trenches to the east of the village. The stormers had rushed forward, preceded by a swarm of men carrying bombs and without rifles. Behind them came a detachment of sappers with planks, fascines, and sand-, bags, together with machine-gun detachments, who dug themselves instantly into the shattered mound. The whole German organization and execution of the attack was admirable. As the survivors of the British front line fell back, two companies of the 1st Cambridge Territorials took up a rallying position. The situation was exceedingly obscure from the rear, for, as already stated, all wires had been cut, but daring personal reconnaissance by individual officers, notably Captain Follett and Lieutenant Elton, cleared it up to some extent. By nine o'clock preparations had been made for a counter-attack, the 1st Leinsters and 1st Royal Irish, of the Eighty-second Brigade, being brought up, while Fortescue's Eightieth Brigade was warned to support the movement.
It was pitch-dark, and the advance, which could only be organized and started at two in the morning, had to pass over very difficult ground. The line was formed by two companies of the Royal Irish, the Leinster Regiment, and the 4th Rifles in general support. The latter regiment was guided to their position by Captain Harrison, of the Cornwalls, who was unfortunately shot, so that the movement, so far as they were concerned, become disorganized. Colonel Prowse, of the Leinsters, commanded the attack. The Irishmen rushed forward, but the Germans fought manfully, and there was a desperate struggle in the darkness, illuminated only by the quick red flash of the guns and the flares thrown up from the trenches. By the light of these the machine-guns installed upon the mound held up the advance of the Royal Irish, who tried bravely to carry the position, but were forced in the end, after losing Colonel Forbes, to be content with the nearest house, and with gaining a firm grip upon the village. The Leinsters made good progress and carried first a breastwork and then a trench in front of them, but could get no farther. About four-thirty the Eightieth Brigade joined in the attack. The advance was carried out by the 4th Rifle Brigade upon the right and the Princess Patricia's (Canadians) upon the left, with the Shropshires and the 3rd Rifles in support. It was all-important to get in the attack before daylight, and the result was that the dispositions were necessarily somewhat hurried and incomplete. The Canadians attacked upon the left, but their attack was lacking in weight, being confined to three platoons, and they could make no headway against the fire from the mound. They lost three officers and twenty-four men in the venture. Thesiger's 4th Rifle Brigade directed its attack, not upon the mound, but on a trench at the side of it. This was carried with a rush by Captain Mostyn Pryce's company. Several obstacles were also taken in succession by the Riflemen, but though repeated attempts were made to get possession of the mound, all of them were repulsed. One company, under Captain Selby-Smith, made so determined an attack upon one barricade that all save four were killed or wounded, in spite of which the barricade was actually carried. A second one lay behind, which was taken by Lieutenant Sackville's company, only to disclose a third one behind. Two companies of the Shropshires were brought up to give weight to the further attack, but already day was breaking and there was no chance of success when once it was light, as all the front trenches were dominated by the mound. This vigorous night action ended, therefore, by leaving the mound itself and the front trench in the hands of the Germans, who had been pushed back from all the other trenches and the portion of the village which they had been able to occupy in the first rush of their attack. The losses of the British amounted to forty officers and six hundred and eighty men — killed, wounded, and missing, about a hundred coming under the last category, who represent the men destroyed by the explosion. The German losses were certainly not less, but it must be admitted that the mound, as representing the trophy of victory, remained in their hands. In the morning of the 15th the Germans endeavoured to turn the Leinsters out of the trench which they had recaptured, but their attack was blown back, and they left thirty-four dead in front of the position.
It is pleasing in this most barbarous of all wars to be able to record that all German troops did not debase themselves to the degraded standards of Prussia. Upon this occasion the Bavarian general in charge consented at once to a mutual gathering in of the wounded and a burying of the dead—things which have been a matter of course in all civilized warfare until the disciples of Kultur embarked upon their campaign. It is also to be remarked that in this section of the field a further amenity can be noted, for twice messages were dropped within the British lines containing news as to missing aviators who had been brought down by the German guns. It was hoped for a time that the struggle, however stern, was at last about to conform to the usual practices of humanity — a hope which was destined to be wrecked for ever upon that crowning abomination—the poisoning of Langemarck.
So intense had been the preliminary fire that every wire connecting with the rear had been severed, and it was only the actual explosion upon the mound—an explosion which buried many of the defenders, including two machine-guns with their detachments — which made the situation clear to the artillery in support. The Nineteenth and Twentieth Brigades concentrated their thirty-six eighteen-pounders upon the mound and its vicinity. The German infantry were already in possession, having overwhelmed the few survivors of the 2nd Cornwalls and driven back the 2nd Irish Fusiliers, who were either behind the mound or in the adjacent trenches to the east of the village. The stormers had rushed forward, preceded by a swarm of men carrying bombs and without rifles. Behind them came a detachment of sappers with planks, fascines, and sand-, bags, together with machine-gun detachments, who dug themselves instantly into the shattered mound. The whole German organization and execution of the attack was admirable. As the survivors of the British front line fell back, two companies of the 1st Cambridge Territorials took up a rallying position. The situation was exceedingly obscure from the rear, for, as already stated, all wires had been cut, but daring personal reconnaissance by individual officers, notably Captain Follett and Lieutenant Elton, cleared it up to some extent. By nine o'clock preparations had been made for a counter-attack, the 1st Leinsters and 1st Royal Irish, of the Eighty-second Brigade, being brought up, while Fortescue's Eightieth Brigade was warned to support the movement.
It was pitch-dark, and the advance, which could only be organized and started at two in the morning, had to pass over very difficult ground. The line was formed by two companies of the Royal Irish, the Leinster Regiment, and the 4th Rifles in general support. The latter regiment was guided to their position by Captain Harrison, of the Cornwalls, who was unfortunately shot, so that the movement, so far as they were concerned, become disorganized. Colonel Prowse, of the Leinsters, commanded the attack. The Irishmen rushed forward, but the Germans fought manfully, and there was a desperate struggle in the darkness, illuminated only by the quick red flash of the guns and the flares thrown up from the trenches. By the light of these the machine-guns installed upon the mound held up the advance of the Royal Irish, who tried bravely to carry the position, but were forced in the end, after losing Colonel Forbes, to be content with the nearest house, and with gaining a firm grip upon the village. The Leinsters made good progress and carried first a breastwork and then a trench in front of them, but could get no farther. About four-thirty the Eightieth Brigade joined in the attack. The advance was carried out by the 4th Rifle Brigade upon the right and the Princess Patricia's (Canadians) upon the left, with the Shropshires and the 3rd Rifles in support. It was all-important to get in the attack before daylight, and the result was that the dispositions were necessarily somewhat hurried and incomplete. The Canadians attacked upon the left, but their attack was lacking in weight, being confined to three platoons, and they could make no headway against the fire from the mound. They lost three officers and twenty-four men in the venture. Thesiger's 4th Rifle Brigade directed its attack, not upon the mound, but on a trench at the side of it. This was carried with a rush by Captain Mostyn Pryce's company. Several obstacles were also taken in succession by the Riflemen, but though repeated attempts were made to get possession of the mound, all of them were repulsed. One company, under Captain Selby-Smith, made so determined an attack upon one barricade that all save four were killed or wounded, in spite of which the barricade was actually carried. A second one lay behind, which was taken by Lieutenant Sackville's company, only to disclose a third one behind. Two companies of the Shropshires were brought up to give weight to the further attack, but already day was breaking and there was no chance of success when once it was light, as all the front trenches were dominated by the mound. This vigorous night action ended, therefore, by leaving the mound itself and the front trench in the hands of the Germans, who had been pushed back from all the other trenches and the portion of the village which they had been able to occupy in the first rush of their attack. The losses of the British amounted to forty officers and six hundred and eighty men — killed, wounded, and missing, about a hundred coming under the last category, who represent the men destroyed by the explosion. The German losses were certainly not less, but it must be admitted that the mound, as representing the trophy of victory, remained in their hands. In the morning of the 15th the Germans endeavoured to turn the Leinsters out of the trench which they had recaptured, but their attack was blown back, and they left thirty-four dead in front of the position.
It is pleasing in this most barbarous of all wars to be able to record that all German troops did not debase themselves to the degraded standards of Prussia. Upon this occasion the Bavarian general in charge consented at once to a mutual gathering in of the wounded and a burying of the dead—things which have been a matter of course in all civilized warfare until the disciples of Kultur embarked upon their campaign. It is also to be remarked that in this section of the field a further amenity can be noted, for twice messages were dropped within the British lines containing news as to missing aviators who had been brought down by the German guns. It was hoped for a time that the struggle, however stern, was at last about to conform to the usual practices of humanity — a hope which was destined to be wrecked for ever upon that crowning abomination—the poisoning of Langemarck.
Report of the Counter Attack on 15th March by 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade
27th Division Commander’s Narrative of the Battle.
St Eloi Photos and Maps 1915
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This website may contain copyrighted material, the use of which has not been specifically authorized by the copyright holder. This material is being made available within this transformative or derivative work for the purpose of education, commentary and criticism, and is believed to be “fair use” in accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107. For more information about this, please see Section 107 of the Copyright Act.
This website is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by the owner of the copyrighted material. All trademarks and copyrights are property of their respective owners. Any images, videos, text, or music used on this website are for illustrative purposes only, and are not intended to imply any endorsement or association with the owner.
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